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Kasia Kozlowska has outlined a useful approach to the clinical assessment and treatment of children and adolescents with functional disorders. 
Unusually for articles about treatment of functional disorder in this age group it does not insist on an exclusively psychological model either for understanding or explaining the symptoms.

Avoiding Assumptions
We have for over a century been used to a model in which functional neurological symptoms, in particular, have been viewed as occurring purely as a result of psychological processes – whether as part of a conversion model, ‘somatising’ or as ‘psychogenic’. Although the biopsychosocial model has been with us for decades, it is only recently that it has finally reached these symptoms, especially those neurological symptoms like paralysis and seizures which are so entwined with the development of psychoanalysis.
Why has the hydraulic notion of “conversion” in which symptoms arise as some kind of by-product of intrapsychic conflict, or its successor “somatisation” of distress, retained intellectual appeal? This is partly because all clinicians, including myself, meet patients in whom those models appear to work. More worryingly though I think they have survived because they help clinicians simplify something which is actually much more complex. As Dr Kozlowska points out, in some children and adolescents you can’t find an obvious stressor, and even if you do, that may not necessarily be relevant to the symptoms. Consider how often you could, if you tried hard enough, formulate a spurious psychosocial explanation for your patients who have a brain tumour or epilepsy?  I was forced to do this during a case control study as part of my PhD(Stone, Warlow, & Sharpe, 2010). It helped me understand how easy it is to make assumptions about stress and life events in functional and conversion disorder and how much harder it is to put them aside and adopt a model that is truly biopsychosocial. 
The neuroscience in conversion disorder has produced some fascinating insights but still has a long way to catch up with our knowledge of biological factors and neural pathways in depression and anxiety, or indeed other physical symptoms such as chronic pain and fatigue which we now understand in more complex ways than purely ‘psychogenic’, even if it is important to retain a psychological dimension to those illnesses.
Kasia Kozlowska’s article describes several helpful perspectives to formulate family issues: attachment theory, physiology of stress/autonomic nervous system and cognitive neuroscience of emotion and motor control. Children and adolescents are perhaps more likely to have identifiable stressors than adults but still parents look for an answer to the question – yes but why is their leg weak, why do they have seizures? Answers to these questions are emerging from the fields discussed, but also from phenomenological studies(Stone, Warlow, & Sharpe, 2012)(Hendrickson, Popescu, Dixit, Ghearing, & Bagic, 2014) and understanding how a predictive organ like the brain can respond to abnormally focused attention(Edwards, Adams, Brown, Pareés, & Friston, 2012). 
A change of aetiological thinking is just one of several changes in the approach and management of conversion disorder that has been proposed over the last decade. The conventional model of conversion disorder started with a patient who had a symptom such as paralysis.  The neurologist declared, without explanation of how they really knew, that there was no disease, and the patient was told that the problem must be psychological. The psychiatrist would then find the “trauma”, or if they couldn’t find it declare that ‘no psychiatric disorder’, or that the stress must be present in some repressed form. The treatment was almost exclusively psychological without any further input from the doctor who made the diagnosis. Although some patients did well, a typical experience was one of an angry and confused patient, frustrated doctors and seeking of a second opinion. 


Trust
We, and others, have proposed a different way of approaching the problem based on a standard model of consultation used for most conditions in medical practice(Stone & Carson, 2015). Importantly it relies on an understanding that functional disorders, especially in neurology, should not be diagnoses of exclusion. The diagnosis depends critically on demonstrating the presence of positive physical signs such as Hoover’s sign of limb weakness (weakness of hip extension that returns to normal with contralateral hip extension), tremor entrainment (cessation or synchronisation of a symptomatic tremor when copying movements with the contralateral hand) or clinical features of attacks (such as resistance to eye opening during a seizure). These are specific for functional disorders and in the correct context allow a positive diagnosis to be made even if there is an additional disease diagnosis. This principle is now much more explicit in DSM-5 (Functional Neurological Symptom Disorder ((Conversion Disorder)(Stone & Carson, 2015).
If a child has Tourette syndrome, the consultation would generally start with ‘you have Tourette syndrome’ rather than describing all the conditions it is not, or explaining that the scans are normal. We should do the same for functional disorders The choice of label may not be as important as making sure that one is provided in a supportive way. A diagnosis is important to a child and their family who are trying to make sense of frightening symptoms and is a signpost to information and understanding of the problem.
The diagnostic process can usefully be discussed with patients and their families, even children. Patients can be shown their Hoover’s sign so they can understand the potential for reversibility of the symptom or a video of their attack. In an article called ‘Trick or Treat’, Mark Edwards and I described our positive experience sharing these neurological ‘secrets’ with patients(Stone & Edwards, 2012). We described how it was possible to explain these features in a supportive way which emphasises positive diagnosis and could merge with physical and psychological rehabilitation. We encourage all health professionals we work with, and not just neurologists, to be familiar at eliciting and sharing these important signs with our patients not only to help them have confidence in the diagnosis but also to help the patient have confidence in the clinician who is trying to help them.
Most people want to know ‘why ‘they have the problem. But in fact a more familiar question to answer is ‘how’. After all, if someone asks why they have a stroke a discussion may follow about a problem with a blood clot causing damage to the brain. That helps patients understand how the symptoms arise but doesn’t explain ‘why’ the blood clot was there in the first place. The conversation may move to a variety of possible reasons, smoking, diabetes or hypertension but the clinician would also recognise a ‘cryptogenic’ stroke in which no cause could be identified. If the patient used to smoke heavily, treatment would not necessarily revolve around long discussions about how that behaviour had led to this situation. If they still smoked you would encourage and give them help to stop but you would only see that as part of their overall treatment – not the sole entry and exit point of treatment – and you would not label the problem a ‘smokogenic stroke’. 
One way of explaining a functional movement disorder, is to describe it as a problem in the software of the nervous system as opposed to the hardware. This approach to describing the mechanism of the symptom does not need to involve a denial of psychological factors or family stress, but can be a way to integrate brain and mind. In our experience, an agreement on mechanism that everyone can sign up to can actually facilitate a more open discussion of risk factors later on. The ‘difficult’ patient or family may often become a lot less difficult when they feel they are believed and being taken seriously – not with the ‘tea and sympathy’ statement of ‘I understand that this weakness/pain is real for you’ – but with ‘This weakness/pain is real, and here’s something about how we think it is happening in your body’. I agree with Dr Kozlowska that psychological questions can often wait until a therapeutic relationship is established. We also agree that discussions about the body should not be seen as a prelude to getting to the ‘psychological core of the problem’ – they should run right through treatment. Increasing evidence in adult patients with functional motor disorders points to the success of physical therapy when carried out by experienced therapists using cognitive behavioural principles(Glenn Nielsen et al., 2015)(G Nielsen et al., 2015)(Jordbru, Smedstad, Klungsøyr, & Martinsen, 2014). A multidisciplinary approach is a cliché, but also one that is often overlooked in these patients.
Transparency
We are used to providing written information or internet links for our patients. The same is now possible for functional disorders whereas previously it was invisible (e.g. www.neurosymptoms.org (​http:​/​​/​www.neurosymptoms.org​) ( I should declare my conflict of interest here in that I made this site – although it is free and has no advertising), www.fndhope.org (​http:​/​​/​www.fndhope.org​), www.nonepilepticattacks.info (​http:​/​​/​www.nonepilepticattacks.info​) ). As with any disorder that people haven’t heard of then information is especially important to help the patient and their family understand their condition and gain confidence that the diagnosis is correct. More is required to make suitable information for children and adolescents and their families. Patient organisations are a new development in the last few years and need to be encouraged. 
Making patient information and wanting to send copies of my letters to patients has forced me to think about the issue of transparency beyond the consultation. Is it reasonable to expect our patients to trust us if we don’t share our correspondence to a third party with them? Similarly, if our patients trust us, shouldn’t they expect our statements and language in research articles and conferences to match what they hear in the clinic? 
This final point is one that challenges us as professionals to think about the words we use and the structures we operate in. If we are really signed up to a biopsychosocial model then do words like “conversion”, “somatisation” and “psychogenic” allow enough freedom of thought or do they continue to constrain our view in a way that may hold back progress in developing both aetiology, mechanism and treatment?(Edwards, Stone, & Lang, 2014) (Fahn & Olanow, 2014).  Is it any surprise that our patients have difficulty accepting a non-dualist explanation when they see a sign on one door saying ‘Neurology’ and another one saying ‘Psychiatry’?  This unnatural separation is a monolithic assumption that will not get overturned in a hurry but which we should be pushing hard at for the sake of our patients.
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